



**AMISOM - IGAD - UNPOS Strategy to Support the TFG
in the Management of the Transitional Period:**

Issues, Challenges and Recommendations

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We the Principals of AMISOM, IGAD Office of the Facilitator for Somalia and UNPOS,

Recalling: The Memorandum of Understanding that we signed on 27th of April, 2010,

Mindful: Of the need to have a common Strategy and an action plan to guide us in coordinating our work on Somalia,


Have adopted and annexed herewith:

- 1. AMISOM – IGAD – UNPOS Strategy to Support the TFG in the Management of the Transition Period and*
- 2. Translation of the AMISOM – IGAD UNPOS Strategic Recommendations into a Regional Work Plan.*


AMISOM

IGAD


UNPOS



Amb. Boubacar G. Diarra



Hon. Kipruto Arap Kirwa



Amb. Augustine P. Mahiga

23rd February, 2011
Nairobi Kenya

Summary of Recommendations

On POLITICAL Issues IGAD, AMISOM and UNPOS agree to:

1. Affirm their common position that the Transition will end on 20 August 2011, in line with the provisions of the Transitional Federal Charter.
2. Reiterate to the TFI leadership (including the President, Prime Minister and the Speaker) the imperative to maintain the stability and cohesion of the TFIs throughout the Transitional period.
3. Strongly encourage political cohesion within the TFIs through continued intensive mediation and engagement with the leadership.
4. Advocate with all stakeholders to urgently conclude the constitution drafting process as the platform for national reconciliation through increased engagement in the constitution making consultation process.
5. Provide requisite capacity support to the TFIs to enable them discharge their mandates in an efficient manner.
6. Continue with the effort to sensitize the international community in provision of adequate and timely resources to TFG.
7. Support the full integration of ASWJ security forces into the TFG National Security Forces (NSF).
8. Urge the international community to provide financial and technical assistance towards the integration of the security forces of the TFG and ASWJ.
9. Establish a mechanism of engagement between the AU High Representative and the three Principals.
10. Encourage the continued deployment of AMISOM and its concept of operations and interventions in Somalia, as guided by a well determined political objective and vision.

On SECURITY Issues IGAD, AMISOM and UNPOS agree to:

1. Support the TFG to undertake a comprehensive security forces reform to ensure effective integration of all its forces.
2. Encourage Somalia, and IGAD Member States that share a border with Somalia to intensify border security and management including air, sea and land.
3. Establish a coordinating mechanism to monitor and identify the movement of subversive elements to and from Somalia and take appropriate measures including engaging the African Union's Committee of Intelligence and Security Services in Africa (CISSA) and Interpol.
4. Engage countries and entities which are currently supporting the spoilers with a view to stopping them from perpetuating their actions.
5. Facilitate intensified outreach and reconciliation between the TFG and potential spoilers of the peace process within and outside Somalia, to diffuse increased incidence of potential spoilers.
6. Establish a mechanism for sharing of information on spoilers.
7. Work together to ensure that the UN Security Council follow up and put in place the enforcement mechanisms for the full implementation of UNSC Resolution 1907 (2009).
8. Follow up the adoption of a resolution endorsing the enhanced personnel levels of AMISOM as contained in the decision of the 245th meeting of the AU PSC.
9. Follow up for the authorization of a predictable and adequate financing mechanism for AMISOM which should be drawn from the UN assessed Budget.
10. Deploy joint effort vis-a-vis the AUC for the AU PSC to hold a Special Summit level meeting on Somalia before end of March 2011 to deliberate on issues on resource mobilisation for Somalia and issues submitted to the UNSC following AU Peace and Security Council's decision at the end of its 245th meeting.
11. Encourage and support TFG to endorse the Security Sector Assessment (SSA) 2009 Report, and finalize the National Security and Stabilization Plan (NSSP) in order to ensure national ownership and implementation.
12. Institute the Joint Coordination Mechanism established pursuant to the decision by IGAD Chiefs of Defence Staff.

13. Urgently reactivate a working group comprising the three organizations under the Joint Security Committee, to deal with defecting fighters from the anti-peace elements.

On HUMANITARIAN Issues IGAD, AMISOM and UNPOS agree to:

1. Increase support for infrastructure development and basic service provision by the Government, the international community and regional authorities across Somalia. Particular focus should be on Mogadishu.
2. Encourage the three organizations to work together in improving the protection of civilians in the areas under AMISOM control in close cooperation with the TFG.
3. Advocate in support of Humanitarian initiatives with non-traditional donors such as League of Arabs State, OIC, Japan, Turkey and China. **On**

INSTIUTIONAL and FINANCIAL Issues IGAD, AMISOM and UNPOS agree to:

1. Engage with UNSOA to complete the premises for use by civilian personnel.
2. Urge UNSOA to enhance the safety standards of the existing premises.
3. Expedite the deployment of civilian personnel to Mogadishu and other regions of Somalia where possible.
4. Facilitate the convening of the High Level Committee (HLC) on a monthly basis in Mogadishu to provide guidance, coordination and decision making between the TFG and the International Community (IC) on political, security, social and financial issues.
5. Undertake systematic resource mobilization efforts to secure sustainable funding for Security Sector Institutions Support (including the TFG, AMISOM, IGAD and UNPOS Trust Funds).
6. Expand the existing oversight and quality assurance mechanism that outlines guidelines for the Peace Building Trust Fund, and the Somalia Security Institutions (SSI) Trust Fund and AMISOM Trust Fund made up of the three organizations.

IGAD-AMISOM-UNPOS Strategy to Support the TFG in the Management of the Transitional Period: Issues, Challenges and Recommendations

I n t r o d u c t i o n

The Transitional Federal Charter (TFC), adopted in August 2004 stipulates certain tasks the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) has to carryout by the end of the Transitional period. The Transitional period which was originally for five years, was extended by parliament after the signing of the Djibouti Agreement until August 2011. The Transitional Federal Charter and the Djibouti Peace Agreement, and subsequent decisions, communiqués endorsed by the Somali parties are the political and legal frameworks for the Transitional period. As partners of the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia, and guarantors of the peace process, IGAD, AMISOM and UNPOS shall ensure that all engagements in Somalia should continue to be guided by the spirit and letter of those documents.

This paper focuses on the key issues and challenges to the political and security sectors, including elements of humanitarian and recovery in Somalia. This includes recommendations for the respective sectors, highlighting the most critical challenges to the management of the Transitional process.

Political Issues

1. Management of the Transitional Process

1.1 According to the TFC and arising out of the spirit of the Djibouti Peace Agreement, the Transitional period should end on 20th August, 2011. In this regard there is currently a strong sense among most actors on Somalia that there should be no extension of the current Transitional period. There should be a clear understanding and policy among the three organizations (IGAD, AMISOM and UNPOS) as to how the current and post transitional period should be managed.

1.2 The Transitional tasks are the tasks the new Somali government has to complete by the end of this period. Some of the key tasks include;

- **The process of developing and finalizing a Federal Constitution** for Somalia. [Article 11, paragraph. 3]
- **A national census** shall be carried out simultaneously to the constitution making process. [Article 11, paragraph. 3]
- **A national referendum** shall be organized to approve the new Constitution. [Article 11, paragraph. 3]
- The operationalization of **administrations at the State, regional and district level** [Article 11, paragraph. 4]
- The set-up of **auxiliary organs** like the Governor of the Central Bank, Auditor General, Accountant General and Attorney General. [Article 12]
- The “process of **federating Somalia** shall take place within a period of two and a half years from the date that the commission is established” [Article 11, paragraph. 9].
- Pass legislation ensuring equitable appropriation and allocation of resources in the country.” [Article 13]
- The formation of political parties in the Republic in accordance with the law. The political parties shall be open for all Citizens and be guided by General Principles of Democracy. [Article 21]
- The end of the Transitional Period will be marked by National elections.

- 1.3 It must be recognized by all partners that the TFG will not achieve many of the Transitional tasks before its mandate expires. This means that consultations and preparations should begin now for a new political arrangement for Somalia, one that would be more broad-based, effective, and enjoys greater legitimacy domestically and internationally.
- 1.4 There continues to be mutual mistrust/misunderstanding between some within the TFG and the Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama'a (ASWJ), as well as lack of mutual confidence between the President, Prime Minister and the Speaker. The lack of strong political cohesion among the leadership of the TFG makes it even more necessary to have a clear road map for the three institutions in their engagement with the TFIs. The continued infighting between the leadership of the TFG hinders the peace process. Hence, a unified position by the three institutions is required to reinforce the need to maintain the stability and cohesion of the TFIs throughout the Transitional Period.
- 1.5 The management of the constitution making process remains a delicate and urgent issue. The adoption of the constitution, as stipulated by the Transitional Federal Charter, continues to pose challenges amidst the prevailing challenging security situation. While partners should continue to provide assistance to the TFG in implementing the transitional tasks, such as the process of deliberating on, and approving the new Constitution, other areas of capacity weaknesses in the TFIs need to be identified and the requisite support provided. Leaders of the TFIs need to be regularly engaged by partners to ensure cohesion in the Government. The ownership of the transition process must be maintained by the people of Somalia, in close coordination with the international community.
- 1.6 The Consultations on the Draft Constitution for Somalia were completed in July 2010 in a process led by the Independent Federal Constitution Commission (IFCC), a Somali body supported by UNDP. The Draft was officially launched on 26 August, 2010, in Mogadishu, Garowe and Galkayo. While the launching of the Draft marked the beginning of a process of civic education and public consultations, envisaged to end in October, differences over the content and process through which the draft was done led to tensions within the TFG. Since then, the President has appointed a team of 18 experts to work with the IFCC. The three institutions should strongly engage in the consultation process which acts as a platform for national reconciliation. Once the outcome of the consultation process is consolidated, the three institutions to strongly engage in consultation process with TFG, TFIs, and all organs established to expedite the drafting process before the end of the transitional period.

1.7 The challenges faced by the TFG and the international community have made it almost impossible for the three pillars of the Djibouti Peace Agreement, namely, political, security and reconstruction/development to be fortified. These include:

- Lack of adequate and predictable funding;
- Weak institutional capacity of the TFG to respond to challenges and design and implement realistic programs of action;
- Volatile and fragile security situation in the country exacerbated by lack of organized national security system that ought to protect government installations and instil confidence in the population;
- Lack of genuine unity and political cohesion among the top leadership of the TFIs that have generated recurring internal crises;
- Lack of an effective strategy that not only encompasses a shared vision and a common approach but also keeps the TFG as pivotal to all efforts in Somalia;
- Poor coordination among the international community in support of the TFG.

1.8 These issues should be given serious consideration in an effort to consciously avoid mistakes of the past. It is also important that these issues are viewed against a backdrop of the constitution making process.

1.9 The appointment of H.E. Jerry Rawlings as the High Representative for Somalia, by the African Union Commission pursuant to the decision of the AU Summit in Kampala, would go a long way in driving the Somalia national reconciliation agenda as well as raise the profile of the Somali conflict among the international community. The African Union Commission is now expected to make the necessary arrangements to enable the AU High Representative, to move with speed and fulfill his mandate.

1.10 The request for additional ground forces in Somalia by AMISOM continues to be guided by a well defined political objective and vision.

A. Recommendations

1. Affirm their common position that the transition will end on 20 August, 2011, in line with the provisions of the Transitional Federal Charter.
2. Reiterate to the TFI leadership (including the President, Prime Minister and the Speaker) the imperative to maintain the stability and cohesion of the TFIs throughout the Transitional period.
3. Strongly encourage political cohesion within the TFIs through continued intensive mediation and engagement with the leadership.

4. Advocate with all stakeholders to urgently conclude the constitution drafting process as the platform for national reconciliation through increased engagement in the constitution consultation process.
5. Provide requisite capacity support to the TFIs to enable them discharge their mandates in an efficient manner.
6. Continue the effort to sensitize the international community in provision of adequate and timely resources to TFG.
7. Establish a mechanism of engagement between the AU High Representative and the three Principals.
8. Encourage the continued deployment of AMISOM and its concept of operations and interventions in Somalia, as guided by a well determined political objective and vision.

2. Engaging groups outside the Government

- 2.1. There are groups that the TFG has signed agreements with, such as the Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama'a and Puntland authorities; agreements, which are yet to be fully implemented. Recognizing that the pursuit of dialogue and reconciliation is one of the principal tasks of the TFG, it is imperative that the Government increases its efforts to engage constructively with a broad range of Somali interlocutors such as the Diaspora, elders, clan and religious leaders, and elements within Hisbul Islam who are willing to engage in dialogue, defect and join the peace process. It would be beneficial if the IGAD, AMISOM and UNPOS could utilize any comparative advantage they individually possess to facilitate discussions between the TFG and groups outside the government.
- 2.2. The three institutions shall continue to support the TFG in its effort to reach out to those opposition groups that are outside the government but committed to peace in Somalia.

2.3. The TFG has made some progress in implementing the Agreement that it has signed with the ASWJ notably, the appointment of Ministers from the latter as members of the TFG cabinet. However, the integration of the security forces and the administrative structure are still outstanding issues that need urgent action by the TFG and require concrete support from the international community. The full integration of security forces of TFG and ASWJ will no doubt be a major step in the fight against the extremist forces.

IGAD that has been instrumental in facilitating the Agreement will have to continue and redouble its effort to urge and encourage the parties to deliver.

B. Recommendations

1. Support the full integration of ASWJ security forces into the TFG National Security Forces.
2. Urge the international community to provide financial and technical assistance towards the integration of the security forces of the TFG and ASWJ.
3. Support the TFG to undertake a comprehensive security forces reform process to ensure effective integration of all forces.
4. The three organizations shall continue to support the TFG in its effort to reach out to those opposition groups that are outside the government but committed to peace in Somalia.

Security Issues

3. Position vis-à-vis spoilers and Enforcement of Arms Embargo

- 3.1. A number of individuals including religious leaders and business people who promote violence or support anti-peace activities continue to camp in and out of Somalia using regional countries as entry and exit points. At its 33rd Extra-Ordinary Session held on 10 July, 2009 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, the IGAD Council of Ministers decided to take immediate action to impose sanctions against certain individuals and entities that have become obstacles to peace in and outside Somalia. Given the necessity to act, it would be essential that practical steps are now taken to effect enforcement of this decision. Measures to influence these individuals are needed to persuade them against engaging in illicit and anti-peace activities.
- 3.2. Reports of aircrafts landing and taking off at different airports within Somalia with some carrying either weapons or insurgents abound. A close monitoring of the Somali airspace, as well as guidance to the TFG leadership would be required. In tandem with the role of the UN Monitoring Group, it remains critical that regional States work out and agree on enforceable mechanisms to effectively curb the violation of the arms embargo. The decision taken by the IGAD Council of Ministers to establish a coordination mechanism on information exchange needs to be implemented and appropriate actions decided upon to practically bring this into effect. As well, practical measures need to be agreed upon on how to assist the TFG to establish secure means of communication, including possible ability to disrupt and/or curb the communications flows of the extremists.
- 3.3. The two issues of position vis-à-vis spoilers and arms embargo run in tandem and require a coordinated implementation approach by all the three organizations. Given that all member states of the UN are expected to implement an arms embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia, except to the TFG, it would be important to monitor the effectiveness of such and other similar resolutions and information obtained shared among the three organizations. In the same context, the three organizations should identify, denounce, and engage countries and entities which are currently supporting spoilers with a view to stopping them from perpetuating their actions.
- 3.4. IGAD member states have already nominated liaison officers who are entrusted with a responsibility to draw up a list of spoilers and share them with the Office of the Facilitator.

IGAD Member States sharing borders with Somalia needs to intensify boarder surveillance and establish a coordination mechanism to monitor, identify and share information on the movement of negative elements to and from Somalia and take appropriate measures. The three organizations should support each other through effective information sharing and reporting.

3.5. Resolution 1907 (2009) adopted by UN Security Council on 23 December, 2009 has elaborated on measures against spoilers of the peace process in Somalia. The Monitoring Group whose mandate has been expanded and renewed by the same resolution is expected to report on the status of implementation of the resolution and member states of UN have been requested to report to the Security Council within 120 days of the adoption of this resolution on steps they have taken to implement specific aspects of the resolution.

3.6. Adoption of Resolution 1907 (2009) is a step in the right direction by the Security Council in spearheading the international effort for peace and security in Somalia. It is in the interest of the people and Government of Somalia and the countries of the region that spoilers are identified, monitored and sanctioned appropriately. Follow up and implementation of this resolution by all concerned, especially the mandated organisation of AMISOM, IGAD and UNPOS is therefore necessary. Mechanism for sharing of information on spoilers among the institutions and with relevant UN entities should be discussed and agreed upon by the three Institutions.

C. Recommendations

1. Encourage Somalia and IGAD member states that share a border with Somalia to intensify border security and management including air, sea and land.
2. Establish a coordinating mechanism to monitor and identify the movement of subversive elements to and from Somalia and take appropriate measures including engaging the African Union's Committee of Intelligence and Security Services in Africa (CISSA) and Interpol.
3. Engage countries and entities which are currently supporting the spoilers with a view to stopping them from perpetuating their actions.
4. Facilitate intensified outreach and reconciliation between the TFG and potential spoilers of the peace process within and outside Somalia, to diffuse increased incidence of potential spoilers.

5. The three Institutions agree to establish a mechanism for sharing of information on spoilers.
6. The three Institutions work together to ensure that the UN Security Council follow up and put in place the enforcement mechanisms for the full implementation of UNSC Resolution 1907 (2009).

4. Deployment of troops, raising the level of AMISOM troops to 20,000

- 4.1. The decision by the 15th IGAD Summit that was endorsed by the AU Summit in Kampala to deploy 2,000 more troops to attain the initially authorised level of 8,100 has been achieved.
- 4.2. Having approved the 12,000 force level under UNSC resolution 1964, the UNSC will now have to take a step further and formally approve the 20,000 troop level as well as make funds available to sustain the elevated level of AMISOM. To proceed on the current unreliable path of voluntary contribution is not a feasible option. The three organizations should jointly pursue at the UNSC level, for a mandatory contribution to support AMISOM's peace keeping operations.
- 4.3. African Union Commission has continued urging AU Member States that have made commitments in the past and those that have recently indicated their willingness to provide troops to AMISOM to do so without further delay. The security concern notwithstanding, the challenge for any African country to send its troops to Somalia has been the unsure and non sustainable nature of funding based on voluntary contribution as well as the inadequate technical and logistical support to the peacekeeping operation. The AUC should consider entrusting to the High Representative, the issue of force generation of 20,000 troops for AMISOM.
- 4.4. In view of the donor fatigue among the international community, the principals of the three organisations shall deploy a joint effort in collaboration with the AUC for the AU PSC to hold a Special Summit Level meeting before end of March 2011. This summit meeting should consider and take decisions on resource mobilisation and on those issues not addressed by the UNSC following the request by the AU PSC at the end of its 245th meeting of October, 15th 2010.
- 4.5. The issue of managing both the public and international image of AMISOM and the TFG forces is becoming increasingly important. The propaganda machinery of Somalia's anti-government elements is proving effective.

The three organizations will, therefore, need to provide additional support for an intensified public information campaign that improves awareness on the role, mandate and achievements of TFG Forces and AMISOM.

D. Recommendations

1. UNSC should urgently adopt a resolution endorsing the enhanced personnel levels of AMISOM as contained in the decision of the 245th meeting of the AU PSC.
2. UNSC also authorize a predictable and adequate financing mechanism for AMISOM and which should be drawn from the UN accessed Budget.
3. Deploy joint effort vis-a-vis the AUC for the AU PSC to hold a Special Summit Level meeting on Somalia before end of March 2011 to deliberate on issues on resource mobilisation for Somalia and issues submitted to the UNSC following AU Peace and Security Council's decision at the end of its 245th meeting.

5. Consolidated Support to security institutions

- 5.1. The daily attacks being launched by the terrorist groups of Al-Shabaab and Hisbul Islam against the TFG and AMISOM peacekeepers have been intensified over the last few months. The recent bombings and target killings have caused enormous loss of civilian lives and heavy casualties. Security remains the main challenge to the TFG and to the people of Somalia in their endeavours to bring back Somalia to a normal and functioning statehood. Under normal circumstances providing security would essentially be the responsibility of the TFG. However, TFG lacks both the security institutional set up including a command and control structure, qualified commanders, equipment and logistics to fight and neutralise the extremist forces.
- 5.2. Fighters who have defected from Al-Shabaab are now being fed by AMISOM. It is believed that there are many especially among the Hisbul Islam fighters who are ready to defect to the government side. It is therefore important to design a program that receives vets and accommodates the transitional fighters and ex-combatants through creation of a number of vocational activities through the establishment of an interim disarmament demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programme. Secure areas are required to implement the programme.

5.3. Training has been provided to TFG security forces and civilian police by a number of countries within and outside the region. While this is a positive development, training of troops alone will not solve the security threats that Somalia is currently facing. Further compounding the situation is the lack of a coordinated overview of the security support, needs and gaps. Realising the danger posed by extremist groups, the three institutions are working to provide an overview on a regular basis. Furthermore, Member States of IGAD have taken a decision to strengthen sub-regional security and conflict prevention mechanisms together with AMISOM to strengthen the security forces of the TFG.

E. Recommendations

1. Encourage TFG to endorse the Security Sector Assessment (SSA) 2009 Report, and finalize the National Security and Stabilization Plan (NSSP) in order to ensure national ownership and implementation.
2. Operationalize the Joint Coordination Mechanism established pursuant to the decision by IGAD Chiefs of Defence Staff.
3. Undertake systematic resource mobilization efforts to secure sustainable funding for Security Sector Institutions Support (including the TFG, AMISOM, IGAD and UNPOS Trust Funds).
4. Agree to expand the existing oversight and quality assurance mechanism that outlines guidelines for the Peace Building Trust Fund, and the Somali Security Institutions (SSI) Trust Fund and AMISOM Trust Fund made up of the three organizations.
5. Agree to urgently reactivate a working group comprising of the three organizations under the Joint Security Committee, to deal with defecting fighters from the anti-peace elements.

Humanitarian Issues

6. Humanitarian Issues

- 6.1. Over the last two years, the humanitarian situation in the country has continued to remain dire with the number of people in need of humanitarian assistance increasing from 1.5 million in 2008 to 2 million people in 2010. Some 1.4 million people remain internally displaced while the number of refugees who have fled to neighboring countries is estimated at nearly 600,000 people. The need for infrastructure repair and strengthening basic service delivery such as food, shelter, water, sanitation and health is critical to save lives; to prevent livelihoods from deteriorating further; and ensuring that populations are resilient to future shocks. Despite the challenges, the humanitarian community has been able to maintain programmes through national staff and Somali NGO partners.
- 6.2. The decline of humanitarian funding has further compounded the complex operating environment. Some traditional donors cut back their contributions in 2009 and 2010 while others introduced national legislation that placed the Al Shabaab on their terrorist list, affecting their ability to provide funds to Somalia. Meanwhile, NGOs are reporting increased scrutiny of their activities and a reluctance by some donors to fund activities in Al-Shabab controlled areas; these are precisely the areas where the majority populations in need reside. The Humanitarian Consolidated Appeal which had requested US\$ 596 million in 2010 is 60% funded with basic services and livelihood support less than 50% funded. The three organizations within their respective mandate and capabilities are facilitating humanitarian response e.g. AMISOM on the ground is engaged in health services and water delivery.
- 6.3. Consultation between the UNCT, UNPOS and AMISOM to ensure effective protection of civilians has been limited. A UN-AMISOM PoC taskforce has been established to develop a Policy Coherence Paper on Protection of Civilians (PoC). The three organizations committed themselves to work together in improving the protection of civilians in the areas under AMISOM control in close cooperation with the TFG. The Protection Cluster collects information on the protection situation in Somalia through the Protection Monitoring Network (PMN). This information is important in order to identify incidents affecting the civilian population and should be used to improve the protection of civilians.

6.4. The already dire humanitarian situation in Somalia is now being complicated by the actions of the armed opposition groups including such acts that degrade the environment. Somalia is currently experiencing drought. Denial of humanitarian access by the armed opposition group is exacerbating the already dire situation. We recognize the need to tackle this situation because it is also impacting on the security situation in Somalia. It is necessary to encourage AU Member States with requisite naval capabilities to undertake measures to deter the activities of the armed opposition groups and use of coastal facilities in furtherance of their heinous activities.

3. Recommendations

1. Increase support for infrastructure development and basic service provision by Government, the international community and regional authorities across Somalia. Particular focus should be on Mogadishu.
2. The three organizations to work together in improving the protection of civilians in the areas under AMISOM control in close cooperation with the TFG.
3. Advocate in support of Humanitarian initiatives with non-traditional donors such as League of Arabs State, OIC, Japan, Turkey and China.
4. The proposed AU PSC at the Summit level should consider and take a decision authorizing AU Member States with naval capabilities to deploy such capabilities in support of AMISOM operations.

Institutional and Financial Issues

7. Relocation of Civilian and Police components of AMISOM, IGAD and UNPOS

- 7.1. The AU Special Representative to Somalia has made clear his commitment to relocate the civilian and police components of AMISOM to Mogadishu. However, the issues to consider include security, AU contractual obligations to staff, and requisite office and accommodation facilities. UNSOA has been constructing premises within the safe areas of Mogadishu. However, the premises built don't meet the minimum standards for civilian staff. It is reported that the physical infrastructures are ready and what remains are electricity and water supplies to be connected to the premises.
- 7.2. The SRSR has indicated on several occasions of his readiness to have a presence of his office in Mogadishu on rotational basis. This also would mean that additional facilities are required. IGAD currently has a Liaison officer in Mogadishu and pursuant to the decision of the IGAD Summit the process to strengthen the Liaison Office is underway. It would be useful to consider accommodation of the IGAD strengthened capacity.
- 7.3. One of the decisions of the 15th IGAD Summit is for IGAD, AMISOM and UNPOS to establish in Mogadishu an operational level coordination mechanism specifically to strengthen and harmonise the support that the three organisations could render to the security forces of the TFG. Therefore AMISOM, IGAD and UNPOS need to prioritize the issue of establishing their presence in Mogadishu.

F. Recommendations

1. Engage with UNSOA to complete the premises for use by civilian personnel.
2. Urge UNSOA to enhance the safety standards of the existing premises.
3. Expedite the deployment of civilian personnel to Mogadishu and other regions of Somalia where possible.
4. Facilitate the convening of the High Level Committee (HLC) on a monthly basis in Mogadishu to provide guidance, coordination and decision making between the TFG and the International Community (IC) on political, security, social and financial issues.

SCHEDULE OF IMMEDIATE ACTIVITIES FOR IMPLEMENTATION

ACTIVITIES	EXPECTED DATE	LEAD ORGANIZATION
1. AU-CONFERENCE IN ACCRA	28 TH FEB. TO 2 ND MARCH 2011	AMISOM
2. HARMONIZATION & PLANNING W/SHOP ON CAPACITY BUILDING FOR TFG	3 RD TO 4 TH MARCH 2011	AMISOM
3. W/SHOP ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MOGADISHU STRATEGY	30 TH TO 31 ST MARCH 2011	UNPOS
4. TFG BUDGET REVIEW AND RESOURCE MOBILIZATION W/SHOP	MAY	UNPOS
5. ORIENTATION W/SHOP FOR TFG CABINET AND SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS	MARCH/APRIL	IGAD
5. W/SHOP ON UNSC RESOLUTION 1907	APRIL	AMISOM & IGAD
7. W/SHOP ON UNSC 1964	MARCH	UNPOS
3. W/SHOP ON TFG-ASWJ AGREEMENT	APRIL	UNPOS
9. W/SHOP ON THE GALKAYO AGREEMENT	MAY	UNPOS

6.4. The already dire humanitarian situation in Somalia is now being complicated by the actions of the armed opposition groups including such acts that degrade the environment. Somalia is currently experiencing drought. Denial of humanitarian access by the armed opposition group is exacerbating the already dire situation. We recognize the need to tackle this situation because it is also impacting on the security situation in Somalia. It is necessary to encourage AU Member States with requisite naval capabilities to undertake measures to deter the activities of the armed opposition groups and use of coastal facilities in furtherance of their heinous activities.

G. Recommendations

1. Increase support for infrastructure development and basic service provision by Government, the international community and regional authorities across Somalia. Particular focus should be on Mogadishu.
2. The three organizations to work together in improving the protection of civilians in the areas under AMISOM control in close cooperation with the TFG.
3. Advocate in support of Humanitarian initiatives with non-traditional donors such as League of Arabs State, OIC, Japan, Turkey and China.
4. The proposed AU PSC at the Summit level should consider and take a decision authorizing AU Member States with naval capabilities to deploy such capabilities in support of AMISOM operations.

Institutional and Financial Issues

7. Relocation of Civilian and Police components of AMISOM, IGAD and UNPOS

- 7.1. The AU Special Representative to Somalia has made clear his commitment to relocate the civilian and police components of AMISOM to Mogadishu. However, the issues to consider include security, AU contractual obligations to staff, and requisite office and accommodation facilities. UNSOA has been constructing premises within the safe areas of Mogadishu. However, the premises built don't meet the minimum standards for civilian staff. It is reported that the physical infrastructures are ready and what remains are electricity and water supplies to be connected to the premises.
- 7.2. The SRSG has indicated on several occasions of his readiness to have a presence of his office in Mogadishu on rotational basis. This also would mean that additional facilities are required. IGAD currently has a Liaison officer in Mogadishu and pursuant to the decision of the IGAD Summit the process to strengthen the Liaison Office is underway. It would be useful to consider accommodation of the IGAD strengthened capacity.
- 7.3. One of the decisions of the 15th IGAD Summit is for IGAD, AMISOM and UNPOS to establish in Mogadishu an operational level coordination mechanism specifically to strengthen and harmonise the support that the three organisations could render to the security forces of the TFG. Therefore AMISOM, IGAD and UNPOS need to prioritize the issue of establishing their presence in Mogadishu.

F. Recommendations

1. Engage with UNSOA to complete the premises for use by civilian personnel.
2. Urge UNSOA to enhance the safety standards of the existing premises.
3. Expedite the deployment of civilian personnel to Mogadishu and other regions of Somalia where possible.
4. Facilitate the convening of the High Level Committee (HLC) on a monthly basis in Mogadishu to provide guidance, coordination and decision making between the TFG and the International Community (IC) on political, security, social and financial issues.

SCHEDULE OF IMMEDIATE ACTIVITIES FOR IMPLEMENTATION

ACTIVITIES	EXPECTED DATE	LEAD ORGANIZATION
1. AU-CONFERENCE IN ACCRA	28 TH FEB. TO 2 ND MARCH 2011	AMISOM
2. HARMONIZATION & PLANNING W/SHOP ON CAPACITY BUILDING FOR TFG	3 RD TO 4 TH MARCH 2011	AMISOM
3. W/SHOP ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MOGADISHU STRATEGY	30 TH TO 31 ST MARCH 2011	UNPOS
4. TFG BUDGET REVIEW AND RESOURCE MOBILIZATION W/SHOP	MAY	UNPOS
5. ORIENTATION W/SHOP FOR TFG CABINET AND SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS	MARCH/APRIL	IGAD
6. W/SHOP ON UNSC RESOLUTION 1907	APRIL	AMISOM & IGAD
7. W/SHOP ON UNSC 1664	MARCH	UNPOS
8. W/SHOP ON TFG-ASWJ AGREEMENT	APRIL	UNPOS
9. W/SHOP ON THE GALKAYO AGREEMENT	MAY	UNPOS

a Regional Work Plan

Recommendations	Expected Tasks/Activities	Duration	Expected Outcome	Lead party/Focal Point
Management of the Transitional Process				
Political				
1. Affirm their common position that the transition will end on 20 August 2011, in line with the provisions of the Transitional Federal Charter	Joint Correspondence to the TFG and Donor Community (done)	Continuous	End of the current transition on 20 August 2011 and the establishment of a new political dispensation	JOINT
2. Strengthening information sharing between AMISOM, IGAD and UNPOS in accordance with the MOU	Three joint programmes in support of the peace process	Quarterly (February, March and May, 2011)	Coherent and effective support to the TFIs	AMISOM- February UNPOS- March IGAD- May
3. Advocate with all stakeholders to urgently conclude the constitution making process.	The three institutions take part in the relevant activities outlined in the work-plan adopted at the CDC November 2010 workshop	continuous	An adopted Constitution for Somalia	UNPOS
4. Provide requisite building support to the TFIs to	Convene a special workshop to come up with a harmonized work-plan on capacity building	February 18-19, immediately after the Accra	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Harmonized capacity building work-plan • Coordinated and 	JOINT/UNPOS

mandates in an efficient manner.				
5. Sensitize the international community to provide adequate and timely resources to enable the TFG to complete the transitional tasks.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> TFG Budget review and resource mobilization workshop Establish accountable system of mobilization and disbursement of funds. Assist the TFG to recruit qualified nationals. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Continuou s Coordinati on meeting of February 2011 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Enhanced confidence among the donors Some transitional tasks accomplished 	JOINT/UNPOS
6. Provide guidance, coordination and decision making between the TFG and the International Community (IC) on political, security, social and financial issues.	Convene the high Level Committee (HLC) every six months – preceding ICG Meetings.	Every six months/ preceding ICG meetings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Coordinate and joint decisions on the management of the transition 	
7. Establish a mechanism of engagement with the AU Eminent person and the three Principals.	Principals begin consultations	continuous	Mechanism of consultation in place.	AMISOM/IGA D
Engage groups outside the Government				
Review the implementation of the TFG /ASWJ Agreement and provide financial and technical assistance for the full implementation of the Agreement.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Convene a meeting between TFG and ASWJ Facilitate the full integration of TFG and ASWJ security and administrative structures 	Third week of February 2011.	Immediate reactivation of the Agreement.	IGAD

<p>Position vis-à-vis spoilers, reinforcement of no-fly zone and naval blockade</p>	<p>1. Encourage IGAD member states that share a border with Somalia as well as administrations of Somaliland and Puntland to intensify border (air, sea and land) security and management.</p> <p>2. Establish a coordinating mechanism to monitor and identify the movement of subversive elements to and from Somalia and take appropriate measures.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Put this issue on the agenda of the forthcoming IGAD CDS meeting. SRSB to engage with the contact group on piracy Call upon UN to adopt a Resolution on no-fly zone and naval blockade. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> February- April 2011 	<p>UNSC decides on enforcement measures on Naval blockade and no fly zone</p>	<p>IGAD/UNPOS</p>
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Formulate a joint programme to enact appropriate national and regional legislation required to deal with these issues. Reactivate the team of IGAD focal points established to monitor the movement of spoilers to and from Somalia. Engage the CISSA and Interpol to track and take action against spoilers 	<p>Jan-March 2011</p>	<p>Spoilers' movement within the region curtailed.</p>	<p>JOINT/GAD</p>

<p>entities which are currently supporting the spoilers with a view to stopping them from perpetuating their actions.</p>	<p>entities supporting those spoilers.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Convene a workshop on Security Council Resolution 1907 to review and recommend enforcement mechanisms for its effective implementation. 	<p>Security Council Resolution 1907 (2009)</p>	
<p>4. Facilitate intensified outreach and reconciliation between the TFG and political spoilers of the peace process within Somalia, to diffuse increased incidences of potential spoilers.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Identify spoilers within Somalia. Assist the TFG diplomatically to engage those spoilers 	<p>Continuous</p>	<p>Expand the authority of the TFG in Somalia</p> <p>AMISOM</p>
<p>5. Establish a mechanism for sharing of information on spoilers.</p>	<p>Build a mechanism of interface with the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia.</p>	<p>Continuous</p>	<p>Effective implementation of the sanctions on spoilers.</p> <p>UNPOS</p>

increased troops level to 20,000.

<p>1. Work towards the convening of the AU PSC meeting at summit level before end of March 2011.</p>		March	Decision at the PSC summit level arrived at	JOINT/AMISOM
<p>2. UNSC should urgently adopt a resolution endorsing the enhanced personnel levels of AMISOM as contained in the decision of the 245th meeting of the AU PSC.</p>	<p>Convene a focus group discussion to push the UNSC to adopt a resolution.</p>	Continuous	UN SC resolution adopted.	JOINT/UNPOS
<p>3. UNSC also authorize a predictable and adequate financing mechanism for AMISOM to be drawn from the UN Accessed Budget.</p>	<p>Convene a focus group discussion to push the UNSC to adopt a resolution.</p>	Continuous	UN SC resolution adopted.	JOINT/UNPOS
<p>Consolidated Support to security institutions</p>				
<p>1. Encourage TFG to endorse the Security Sector Assessment (SSA) 2009 Report, and finalize the National Security and Stabilization Plan (NSSP) in order to ensure national ownership and implementation.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Include in the agenda of the High Level Committee. Immediate implementation of urgent recommendations contained in the SSA to begin. • Support a comprehensive security forces reform process to ensure effective integration of all TFG forces 	Next meeting of the High Level Committee	Endorsement of SSA report and NSSP by the TFG.	JOINT/UNPOS
<p>2. Operationalize the Joint Coordination Mechanism</p>	<p>IGAD to deploy and maintain a team of military experts in</p>	February 2011	TFG forces supported.	IGAD

the decision of IGAD Chiefs of Defense Staff.					
Humanitarian Issues					
1. Increase support for infrastructure development and basic service provision by the TFG.	Focus group discussion with the humanitarian service providers.	Continuous	Infrastructure development and basic service provision by the TFG realized.	JOINT/UNPOS	
2. The three organizations to work together in improving the protection of civilians in the areas under AMISOM control in close cooperation with the TFG.	Focus group discussion with the humanitarian and human rights actors.	Continuous	Protection of civilians improved.	JOINT/UNPOS	
3. Advocate in support of Humanitarian initiatives, with non-traditional donors such as League of Arab State, OIC, Japan, Turkey and China.	Include in the agenda of the next International Contact Group meeting	February	To harness resources and contributions from non-traditional donors to the CAP for Somalia.	JOINT/UNPOS	
INSTITUTIONAL AND FINANCIAL ISSUES					
Relocation of Civilian and Police Components of AMISOM, IGAD and UNPOS					
1. Engage with UNSOA to complete the premises in	Arrange a meeting with UNSOA Director	Next meeting of the principals.	Premises ready for use by civilian personnel of	UNPOS	

personnel.						
2. Urge UNSOA to enhance the safety standards of the existing premises.	Agree to enhance the safety standards of the existing premises.	Agree to enhance the safety standards of the existing premises.	Agree to enhance the safety standards of the existing premises.	Agree to enhance the safety standards of the existing premises.	Agree to enhance the safety standards of the existing premises.	UNPOS
3. Expedite the deployment of civilian personnel to Mogadishu and other regions of Somalia where possible.	Expedite the deployment of civilian personnel to Mogadishu and other regions of Somalia where possible.	Expedite the deployment of civilian personnel to Mogadishu and other regions of Somalia where possible.	Expedite the deployment of civilian personnel to Mogadishu and other regions of Somalia where possible.	Expedite the deployment of civilian personnel to Mogadishu and other regions of Somalia where possible.	Expedite the deployment of civilian personnel to Mogadishu and other regions of Somalia where possible.	UNPOS/AMISOM
4. Undertake systematic resource mobilization efforts to secure sustainable funding for Security Sector Institutions Support (including the TFG, AMISOM, IGAD and UNPOS Trust Fund.)	Undertake systematic resource mobilization efforts to secure sustainable funding for Security Sector Institutions Support (including the TFG, AMISOM, IGAD and UNPOS Trust Fund.)	Undertake systematic resource mobilization efforts to secure sustainable funding for Security Sector Institutions Support (including the TFG, AMISOM, IGAD and UNPOS Trust Fund.)	Undertake systematic resource mobilization efforts to secure sustainable funding for Security Sector Institutions Support (including the TFG, AMISOM, IGAD and UNPOS Trust Fund.)	Undertake systematic resource mobilization efforts to secure sustainable funding for Security Sector Institutions Support (including the TFG, AMISOM, IGAD and UNPOS Trust Fund.)	Undertake systematic resource mobilization efforts to secure sustainable funding for Security Sector Institutions Support (including the TFG, AMISOM, IGAD and UNPOS Trust Fund.)	UNPOS
5. Agree to expand the existing oversight and quality assurance mechanism that outlines guidelines for the Peace Building Trust Fund, and the Somali Security Institutions (SSI) Trust Fund and AMISOM Trust Fund made up of the three organizations.	Agree to expand the existing oversight and quality assurance mechanism that outlines guidelines for the Peace Building Trust Fund, and the Somali Security Institutions (SSI) Trust Fund and AMISOM Trust Fund made up of the three organizations.	Agree to expand the existing oversight and quality assurance mechanism that outlines guidelines for the Peace Building Trust Fund, and the Somali Security Institutions (SSI) Trust Fund and AMISOM Trust Fund made up of the three organizations.	Agree to expand the existing oversight and quality assurance mechanism that outlines guidelines for the Peace Building Trust Fund, and the Somali Security Institutions (SSI) Trust Fund and AMISOM Trust Fund made up of the three organizations.	Agree to expand the existing oversight and quality assurance mechanism that outlines guidelines for the Peace Building Trust Fund, and the Somali Security Institutions (SSI) Trust Fund and AMISOM Trust Fund made up of the three organizations.	Agree to expand the existing oversight and quality assurance mechanism that outlines guidelines for the Peace Building Trust Fund, and the Somali Security Institutions (SSI) Trust Fund and AMISOM Trust Fund made up of the three organizations.	UNPOS/UNSOA
6. Agree to urgently reactivate a working group comprising of the three organizations under the Joint Security Committee, to deal with defecting fighters from the anti peace elements	Agree to urgently reactivate a working group comprising of the three organizations under the Joint Security Committee, to deal with defecting fighters from the anti peace elements	Agree to urgently reactivate a working group comprising of the three organizations under the Joint Security Committee, to deal with defecting fighters from the anti peace elements	Agree to urgently reactivate a working group comprising of the three organizations under the Joint Security Committee, to deal with defecting fighters from the anti peace elements	Agree to urgently reactivate a working group comprising of the three organizations under the Joint Security Committee, to deal with defecting fighters from the anti peace elements	Agree to urgently reactivate a working group comprising of the three organizations under the Joint Security Committee, to deal with defecting fighters from the anti peace elements	AMISOM/UNPOS